Why 5G Devices Cannot Fully Replace Tactical Radios in LSCO

The U.S. Army’s effort to replace traditional tactical radios with Android-based End User Devices (EUDs) operating over 5G and Wi-Fi networks promises faster information sharing and operational flexibility. However, modernization without resilient backup systems risks catastrophic failure in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against near-peer adversaries. In environments where emissions are exploited and networks collapse under attack, soldiers must retain the ability to communicate independently of vulnerable infrastructure.

The Army’s Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) initiative proposes eliminating traditional radios at the tactical edge, shifting responsibility to 5G-connected EUDs, as reported in DefenseScoop’s article. These devices offer bandwidth gains and integration with mission applications. Yet they assume persistent network access, minimal spectrum contestation, and electromagnetic superiority, assumptions that are unlikely to survive first contact with capable adversaries.

Modern radios like the AN/PRC-152 and AN/PRC-160 provide low-signature, infrastructure-independent communications. The PRC-160 in particular can transmit both secure voice and data in ciphertext, ensuring operational flexibility even in degraded or denied environments. Their elimination from the Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE) framework would strip Army formations of crucial fallback options when digital networks are denied or degraded.

Critical Vulnerabilities

Persistent Emissions and RF Signature Exposure

Continuous emissions from 5G and Wi-Fi devices create unavoidable electronic signatures (example). Joint Publication 3-13.1 highlights the criticality of electromagnetic spectrum control. Russia’s operations in Ukraine revealed that forces unable to control their RF emissions were rapidly targeted and destroyed. Analyses of the 2014 Donbas conflict and reports from 2022 show that artillery strikes often followed RF detections within minutes.

Adversaries like China and Russia will not permit persistent, detectable battlefield networks to survive uncontested. Spectrum denial, jamming, and kinetic targeting of emitters will be among their primary objectives from the outset.

Fragility of 5G and Wi-Fi Networks

Unlike traditional radios, 5G networks rely on fixed or semi-mobile infrastructure: base stations, backhaul links, and nodes. Even expeditionary systems demonstrated during Project Convergence remain vulnerable to artillery, UAV strikes, and cyber intrusion. In a Pacific island-hopping campaign, adversaries could deny communications before U.S. forces fully consolidate, paralyzing command and control (C2) and slowing operational momentum.

Hardening such infrastructure under combat conditions would require significant resources and rapid-repair capabilities not currently fielded.

Overreliance on Commercial Technology

The FY24 National Defense Authorization Act warns against overreliance on commercial supply chains and software ecosystems for mission-critical systems. Android-based EUDs, even with military overlays, inherit vulnerabilities like firmware exploits, supply chain compromises, and patch management gaps. Compromised EUDs could provide adversaries with metadata leakage, location tracking, or even backdoor access into tactical networks.

Civilian-grade availability and cyber resilience standards are insufficient for high-intensity warfare.

Degraded and Denied Communications

FM 3-12 stresses preparing for Denied, Degraded, Intermittent, and Limited bandwidth (D-DIL) environments. Heavy reliance on 5G contradicts this principle. Chinese doctrine emphasizes early electromagnetic suppression of adversary communications, including spoofing, jamming, and destruction of critical nodes (example).

Tactical formations that rely exclusively on persistent network connectivity risk isolation at critical moments.

Weakening Tactical JADC2 Resilience

Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) promises sensor-to-shooter integration across domains. But tactical units depending solely on 5G networks create single points of failure. If battalion and company formations lose communications during operations, broader operational cohesion fractures.

Tactical resilience must be engineered into JADC2 systems from the beginning — not assumed as a byproduct of higher-level integration.

Solutions to Mitigate the Risks

Retain Tactical Radios as Redundant Systems: Traditional radios must remain an essential part of PACE communications planning. Independently powered, low-signature radios ensure units retain basic C2 capabilities even if digital networks fail.
Harden 5G and Mesh Networks: Where 5G must be deployed, nodes should be hardened against kinetic strikes, equipped with autonomous rerouting protocols, and capable of rapid displacement. Self-healing mobile mesh networks must be prioritized for fielding to tactical echelons.
Develop Non-RF Communications Alternatives: Free-space optical (FSO) communications and Li-Fi offer viable, low-signature alternatives. Army Futures Command experiments have shown promise. These technologies must be urgently fielded to offer redundant, resilient battlefield options.
Train Soldiers for D-DIL Operations: Units must train regularly under degraded network conditions. Soldiers must master manual authentication, low-signature radio operation, and emission control (EMCON) practices. FM 6-02 outlines doctrinal requirements but training must reinforce these realities.
Build Tactical JADC2 Resilience: Company- and battalion-level C2 nodes must train for extended autonomous operations under blackout conditions. Restoration timelines measured in hours or days must be realistic planning assumptions — not minutes.

Addressing Counterarguments

Modernization advocates argue that EUDs and 5G networks provide decisive operational advantages. They are correct: faster information sharing, enhanced situational awareness, and decentralized decision-making are critical. However, modernization must not eliminate survivability. EUDs and 5G should augment, not replace, resilient, low-emission communications capabilities that can endure under fire.

Without such redundancy, the Army risks creating digitally sophisticated units that lose effectiveness the moment they are electronically contested.

Conclusion

Modernization should never compromise operational survivability. In LSCO, the ability to communicate after the first electromagnetic blackout will decide tactical and operational outcomes. Tactical radios remain indispensable survival tools — not outdated relics. As Army communications evolve, leadership must ensure new capabilities are layered atop resilient foundations, not replace them.

Soldiers’ lives and mission success depend on it.

Author Bio:

Sergeant Jonathan K. Fredlund is an active-duty U.S. Army network administrator stationed in Germany with operational experience in secure tactical communications, SATCOM, and cybersecurity. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

References

DefenseScoop. Army could be eliminating radios at the tactical edge, Gen. Mingus says. (Apr 22, 2025). https://defensescoop.com/2025/04/22/army-could-be-eliminating-radios-at-tactical-edge-gen-mingus/
L3Harris. AN/PRC-160(V) Wideband HF/VHF Manpack Radio. https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/an-prc-160v-wideband-hf-vhf-manpack-radio
DefenseScoop. Signature management is key tenet of Army’s digital transformation. (Aug 17, 2023). https://defensescoop.com/2023/08/17/signature-management-is-key-tenet-of-armys-digital-transformation/
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-13.1: Electronic Warfare. (Jan 25, 2007). https://edocs.nps.edu/dodpubs/topic/jointpubs/JP3/JP3_13_1_070125.pdf
Jamestown Foundation. Blind, Confuse, and Demoralize: Russian Electronic Warfare Operations in Donbas. (2014). https://jamestown.org/program/blind-confuse-and-demoralize-russian-electronic-warfare-operations-in-donbas/
The War Zone. This Is What’s Happened So Far In Ukraine’s Electronic Warfare Battle. (2022). https://www.twz.com/this-is-whats-happened-so-far-in-ukraines-electronic-warfare-battle
U.S. Army. Project Convergence Spotlight. https://www.war.gov/Spotlights/Project-Convergence/
Inside Government Contracts. Key Supply Chain Provisions of the NDAA for FY 2024. (Jan 2024). https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2024/01/key-supply-chain-provisions-of-the-national-defense-authorization-act-ndaa-for-fiscal-year-fy-2024/
U.S. Army. FM 3-12: Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33127-FM_3-12-000-WEB-1.pdf
Jamestown Foundation. PLA Stratagems for Establishing Wartime Electromagnetic Dominance. https://jamestown.org/program/pla-stratagems-for-establishing-wartime-electromagnetic-dominance-an-analysis-of-the-winning-mechanisms-of-electronic-countermeasures/
U.S. Army. FM 6-02: Signal Support to Operations. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19185_FM%206-02_FINAL_WEB.pdf

Cyber Implications of Tactical Radio Deprecation